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The First and the Fifth. By 0. JOIN ROGGE. New York: Thomas Nelson &
Sons, 1960. Pp. 358. $5.00.
The dust jacket of this book promises discussion of something old and
something new. The new is "Some Unenumerated Rights." Among these
rights are freedom to travel, freedom of knowledge, and the right to privacy.
They get slight attention. The primary conclusion seems to be that the ninth
amendment will be of little assistance in furthering their establishment. Mr.
Rogge is undoubtedly correct in this conclusion, but his discovery is unlikely
to occasion any widespread wonderment. He does suggest that the Supreme
Court has some molding power in the formulation of such rights, and that the
existence of the ninth amendment, rather than anything it says specifically,
may assist ". . . to make the document as timeless as possible."1 He tritely
warns that the molding may go too far; that in the guise of construing the
Constitution one may be ".... engaged in amending it."2
I think it not unfair to Mr. Rogge to observe that he says nothing either
new or valuable about "unenumerated rights." It would, however, be unfair
to suggest that even the author regards his discussion of those matters as im-
portant to his basic theme. Only forty pages of over three hundred are devoted
to them. He does not even bother to come to any particular conclusions about
them. It is my impression that he wrote this book, or perhaps more accurately
assembled it,3 out of high concern about some rights so well enumerated that
the numbers have passed into common language-"taking the fifth" is only
too well known.
Mr. Rogge has elaborately researched and documented his treatment of
what he calls the rights to speech and to silence. Still, it is hard to uncover
anything genuinely new in that process. The history has been intensively
mined many times by highly qualified men. Mr. Rogge, however, draws dif-
ferent conclusions from that history. In his view, the first amendment restrains
the federal government from interference with speech in any form, and with-
' p. 304. He neither says why this is good, nor observes that his supporting quotation
from Justice Marshall says something different.
2 P. 304.
3 All the important parts first appeared as law review articles and have been brought up
to date for this publication. The only significant change for the worse is that the article foot-
notes have been transferred to the back of the book and the numbering removed from the
text. As a consequence, they are wholly unusable. Trial and error finally disclosed that the
reference "P. 12, 1. 21 .... was to the first citation in the 21st line of page 12. Forty-three
pages are entirely wasted in this manner.
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out any exceptions--"speech is as free as thought" itself.4 To him, it matters
not how vigorously the idea is stated, or how calculated it is to bring about
substantive harms; the idea can be shouted from a rostrum or stated philo-
sophically in a seminar. The Yates 5 distinction is bad, and should be aban-
doned. Nor is it permissible to qualify the right by discount formulae or clear-
and-present danger tests. The famous Schenck6 reservation about the man who
shouts "fire" in a crowded theatre is unfortunate; that conduct is indeed punish-
able, but because it is conduct, not speech. Neither advocacy nor conspiracy to
advocate can be punished except as part of unlawful action; and then it is the
action, not the words, that justifies the punishment.
The last proposition suggests that Mr. Rogge adopts the rather conventional
notion that speech is protected in order to further the transmittal of ideas.
But he is as damning of obscenity controls as he is of restraints on political
speech, and makes no qualifications about "redeeming social importance." 7
In short, there is absolutely no federal control over speech. This conclusion
rests less upon the first amendment than upon the proposition that there
simply is no federal power over speech at all. He is concerned not with measur-
ing what congressional power was taken away by the first amendment but
with demonstrating that no power was ever given Congress in the first place.
I am sure that Mr. Rogge does not like the consequence, implicit in his
argument, that the states do-so far as the federal constitution is concerned-
have power to restrain advocacy as well as action, and sedition, and prurience.
But he is faithful to his history as he finds it, and expresses the hope that the
states will learn to restrain themselves.8
I would like to think that the free speech clause is "incorporated" in the
fourteenth amendment. I reluctantly agree that it is not. Could I ignore his-
tory, or remake it, I would choose the very opposite of Mr. Rogge's position.
I could endure the loss of the first amendment restraint on Congress if I were
assured that at least its rough equivalent were contained in the fourteenth.
Writing about the fifth amendment right to silence, Mr. Rogge expresses
satisfaction with the Warren Court's treatment of the problem of coerced con-
fessions. But he does suggest that preoccupation with use of the fifth amend-
ment by the guilty, and undue emphasis upon the merely "incidental" function
of protection of the innocent who become circumstantially implicated, have
obscured the more important purpose of the amendment. History, as he reads
4p. 10.
5 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
6 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
7 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
8 Although far removed from his discussion of state power over speech, this seems his
only means of restraining state action. P. 274. He does suggest that this is "within certain
limits." But he has denied the only known source of federal limits and suggests no alternative
source.
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it, compels the conclusion that the right to silence includes the right not to
betray one's confederates. He condemns the Rogers9 rule of waiver, not on the
usual ground that it prevents us from getting information to which we are
entitled, but on the broad ground that we are not entitled to the information.
Some years ago Dean Griswold took up the defense of the privilege against
self-incrimination when it was under bitter attack.0 Much of his argument was
based upon the point Mr. Rogge here rejects as incidental-that it protects the
innocent as well as the guilty. Almost concurrently with Mr. Rogge's expres-
sion of his views, Dean Griswold has agreed that justifying the privilege as
protection for the innocent was a "mistake."" Yet a vital difference between
their views remains. Dean Griswold still thinks, as I understand him, that the
constitutional privilege does not extend to protect others. He holds only that
the failure of our society to grant to political thought and association the pro-
tection which they deserve justifies occasional instances of abuse of the privi-
lege. Not so Mr. Rogge. He would grant the privilege to be silent as a matter
of right, compelled by the constitution and supported by history. He does not
even limit his position expressly to inquiries into beliefs and associations, al-
though the context makes it apparent that this is where he thinks it most
important.
The privilege we know today is a truly remarkable extension of what the
constitutional language and history would justify. I doubt that we could ac-
complish it again if we had to start from scratch. But could I make the system
over, I would not want to go as far as Mr. Rogge. In operating the system (as
distinguished from re-ordering it), I would be obliged to take into account
what seems to me his strongest argument. Do we ever-whether from an em-
bezzling bank teller in a criminal prosecution or a political deviant before a
congressional committee-get useful and reliable information as a result of
ordering a man to answer? We usually get perjury. We often have gotten the
satisfaction of punishing him for not answering. That kind of satisfaction we
are ashamed to admit and should be unwilling to take.
Mr. Rogge is very bold. I must conclude, for myself, that on his major
thesis-that both speech and silence are beyond the power of government to
control-he is baldly wrong. Yet it is a good book to read, and anyone inter-
ested in these freedoms (and who cannot be?) will be rewarded by reading it
with care. Readers probably will not "buy" his history, but they will admire
the way he adheres to it, accepting the bad inferences along with the good.
For example, although he protests immunity acts and would have none of
them (at least apart from what he calls economic crimes), he finds them to be
constitutional because history sustains them. Readers will also be impressed
9 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
10 GRIswoLD, THE Farm AMENDMETr TODAY (1955).
11 Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L, Rav. 216, 223 (1960),
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with some of his lesser arguments, such as that the Immunity Act of 1954 is
invalid because it requires a federal judge to exercise nonjudicial functions. I
have not discussed those arguments, good as most are, because Mr. Rogge
thinks, as do I, that he must stand or fall on the history. For myself, I think he
fell. But in the process he does something to restore to respect rights which, if
founded in history, speak of something greater still-the inviolability of the
individual. Others have observed the paradox of throttling our freedoms under
the guise of defending them. In a similar contradiction, Mr. Rogge has written
a quite wrong good book.
RONAN E. DEGNAN*
* Professor of Law, University of Utah.
Cases and Materials on Torts. By CHAuEs 0. GREGORY and HARRY KALVEN,
JR. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1959. Pp. 1309. $12.50.
Cases and Materials on Torts, edited by Professors Charles 0. Gregory and
Harry Kalven, Jr., is an exacting and provocative collection of cases and ex-
cerpts from torts literature for use in the classroom. This review is limited to
observations that may be of assistance to the torts teacher in search of a more
effective teaching vehicle. The book is not for those who, because of time
restrictions or suspected deficiencies in student sophistication, feel that class
work must be restricted largely to a bare exposition of tort rules and doctrines.
Gregory & Kalven can be used effectively only by the teacher who has the
opportunity to probe deeply and who enjoys a degree of confidence in the
capacity and industry of his first-year students. This book promptly goes be-
hind the scenes and stays there.
Before turning to Gregory and Kalven's organization, a word about the
types of material and the mechanics of presentation used may be appropriate.
The profound line of attack that the editors have developed could not be at-
tempted within available time limits without a diligent eye toward the selec-
tion, intermixture and ordering of materials. Teachers accustomed to the
usual parade of cases followed by rather spare footnotes may be struck by the
editors' extensive resort to excerpts from the periodical literature. So much of
this material is compressed within the book that a casual examination could
give the impression that the 1300 page volume is somewhat too long for effec-
tive use. But further consideration makes it obvious that much of this same
material would be assigned as collateral reading by most teachers using a less
voluminous casebook. For this reason a net saving in time for the conscien-
tious student is actually effected, because the editors have presented only those
passages which bear directly upon the problem being considered at the time.
If any criticism is to be made here, it would be that there may be too few
cases, and that many of those which are presented have been over-severely
edited. This is not a book that stresses case analysis.
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